Aesthetic Sensibility and Political Praxis: Foucault, Lyotard and the Darfur Crisis by Bartlett, Anne et al.
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences
2009
Aesthetic Sensibility and Political Praxis: Foucault,
Lyotard and the Darfur Crisis
Anne Bartlett
University of San Francisco, albartlett@usfca.edu
Gerard Kuperus
University of San Francisco, gkuperus@usfca.edu
Marjolein Oele
University of San Francisco, moele@usfca.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/phil
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bartlett, Anne; Kuperus, Gerard; and Oele, Marjolein, "Aesthetic Sensibility and Political Praxis: Foucault, Lyotard and the Darfur




Anne Bartlett, Gerard Kuperus and Marjolein Oele 
“Aesthetic Sensibility and Political Praxis: Foucault, Lyotard and the 
Darfur Crisis” (with Anne Bartlett and Marjolein Oele), in: Radical 
Philosophy Review, (Vol. 12 (1-2), 2009) 
 
Introduction 
The Darfur crisis has resulted in the largest humanitarian operation in the world today: the 
displacement of 4 million people, the annihilation of in excess of 400,000 people and the rape, 
humiliation and injury of countless others. It is a crisis of epic proportions whose effects are well 
known worldwide and whose dynamics are subject to intense scrutiny in the search for a 
diplomatic solution. Over the past six years, Darfur has become part of the landscape of 
international violence and ethnic conflict: a horrific reminder of brutal state excess and the 
apparent powerlessness of citizens to resist.  
Writing about Darfur and the crisis that has enveloped the region requires a keen eye to the 
political history of Sudan, since it is in this history that the seeds of political transformation can 
be found.  In many accounts of the crisis thus far, we are treated to discrete episodes in the 
production of dissent: episodes that in and of themselves do not provide the impetus to uprising. 
Darfur is written as if particular groups – The Government, The Janjawiid, The Rebelsi – appear 
naturally from the fog of war and political organization. We are assured that in knowing 
something about these groups, we also know something about the dynamics of crisis. Yet even a 
cursory look to the role of Darfur in the larger political history of Sudan speaks volumes about 
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the rationale for insurgency. It demonstrates that the conflict is deeply political and is wound 
tightly around issues of naming, construction of difference and questions of belonging to a larger 
political project of nationhood.   
In this situation, political space can take a number of forms. It can be expansive, oriented to a 
community of belonging which takes as its goal the creation of an imagined community.ii It can 
also, in the face of modernization, be oriented towards creating a type of cultural glue needed to 
sustain a territorial unit in the face of change.iii Yet for all the ideas of what nationhood might be, 
it need not be inclusionary at all. Political space can be deeply exclusionary where peripheral 
areas are not included in the trajectory of modernization or the conversation of what being a 
citizen might actually mean. In this case, nationhood can be a project of domination and the 
denial of the right to speak.   
This paper presents two closely related philosophical perspectives on political spaces in which 
we find domination, the denial of the right to speak and exclusion. We argue that Michel 
Foucault’s early work on power-relationships can help us to understand how shifting discourses 
of power in Sudan in the past few decades have led to political and cultural hegemony and 
oppression. Moreover, we argue that Foucault’s later concept of the aesthetics of existence is 
extremely helpful to comprehend how insurgent subjectivities in Sudan came about and how they 
recreated and revised the political landscape. In addition, we claim that according to Foucault art 
can further the sensibility of the individual and this sensibility is exactly required in the call for 
action that remains often unheard in a situation such as the Darfur crisis. In a similar manner 
Jean-François Lyotard argues that the aesthetic realm opens up the possibility to bear witness to 
that which lies beyond the possibility of presentation. One of the key questions for Lyotard is 
what it means to be silenced, to not be able to express the injustice that one experiences. It is also 
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for Lyotard the aesthetic realm that provides the possibility to develop a sensibility to hear the 
unheard, and to bear witness to the injustice of a politics of domination. 
An important issue that arises in reflecting upon a situation such as Darfur is the possibility 
that a Western approach of a Non-Western situation involves yet another silencing. The 
philosophers selected for this paper are very sensitive to such silencing: Foucault always searches 
for and fights situations of silencing and domination; one of Lyotard’s main concerns is to bear 
witness to such situations. In addition, by discussing artworks from Darfur, we seek to invoke the 
voices of those who speak about the crisis in their own, native tongue: the Sudanese artist Khalid 
Kodi who in powerful visual installations and paintings displays the hidden horrors and 
complexities of power-struggles in Darfur and the singer Maryam Ammo who in her songs 
describes the deterioration of life in Darfur. 
We start with an analysis of Foucault’s thoughts on the importance of aesthetics in relation to 
sensibility and political domination. These ideas are related to art from Darfur. Foucault’s ideas 
on sensibility are then furthered through a discussion of Lyotard’s ideas on conflicts which 
cannot be resolved and the aesthetic experience of the sublime. These ideas will again be tied 
back to the situation of the Darfur crisis.  
 
I. Foucault and Darfur: Power and Aesthetics  
 
I.1 Foucault, Power-relationships and Darfur  
Michel Foucault’s analyses of (post)modern times can be said to have left us with an indefinite 
suspicion for modern institutions and modern thought. His works echo and perpetuate the 
Nietzschean distrust in modern conceptions. The disenchantment and disillusion about the end of 
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metaphysics which culminated in Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the death of God has in Foucault’s work 
been extended to a specific distrust in the ideals of the modern subject. Foucault thereby not only 
problematizes the idea of the autonomy of the modern subject and subjects that idea to various 
critical questions, but he also shows the inherent linkage of concepts of subjectivity to ‘games of 
truth.’iv His analyses present a torn view on human subjectivity: instead of being a power-center 
itself, the human subject arises as a result of a certain way of speaking, thinking and acting, and 
thus as a result of truth and power games. 
Foucault discusses the role of power-relationships through his well-known explorations of the 
discourses of medicine, the punitive system, and sexuality,v and his potent analyses have resulted 
invi and continue to invite further applications and extensions. The political crisis in Darfur is one 
of those social realities whose complexities can be understood more clearly when looked at from a 
Foucaultian perspective. While the crisis in Darfur with its excessive violence and diplomatic 
stalemate is all-too well-known and frequently described, what has been omitted in many of these 
reports is an account of the dominant discourse and insurgent subjectivities that have given shape 
to the conflict and whose nuances often escape the radar of Western sensibilities. To understand 
the crisis, we need to go back to the very reality and history of Sudan since its independence. Since 
the time of Sudan’s so-called “independence” in 1956, the goal for Sudan has been to imitate its 
former occupier and to emulate the discourse of the nation-state. This discourse of the nation-state 
however, was not extended to include all the voices of Sudan. Instead, Sudan’s colonial master 
gave the right so speak this discourse and enact it to only a few elite tribal groups located in the 
area of the upper Nile (the political North). vii 
 Consequently, what emerged in Sudan was a certain degree of hegemony, which was facilitated 
by the relations between the military and the ability to invoke religion as a justificatory rationale 
for the maintenance of the status quo. While claiming the discourse of the nation-state, the tribal 
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groups in the upper Nile area universalized their own idea of what it meant to be Sudanese and 
thus monopolized ethnicity, culture and language. As Foucault argues, the way we speak, think and 
act is not an innocent and individual way, but the product of a certain cultural discourse that profits 
from this way. Similarly, the language of the nation-state was a product of a certain powerful 
group that profited from its hegemony. It language held sway over the citizens of Sudan for quite a 
while and kept the peace this way. With its demand for universality it seemed to include all its 
citizens, although its actual discourse was, in fact, that of the selective few who imposed their 
norms and values upon the voiceless majority.  
 In Darfur, the political life at the national level inevitably produced a certain kind of 
understanding of what being political meant, and necessarily suppressed other normative claims. In 
particular as a result of the history since independence, nationhood was tied up with a strong 
discourse of what it meant to be Sudanese that emanated from elite culture and authoritarian 
dominance. This served to create an other of anyone outside of the Political North and to make 
politics less relevant to those who were not part of the chosen few. Through the imposition of 
Arabic as the lingua franca, Islam as the religion of choice, Sharia as the system of control, the so-
called “Sudanese” discourse was experienced as universal and all-domineering.  
However, cracks were beginning to emerge in this discourse due to three factors, and it were 
these three factors that resulted in the Darfur-crisis as we know it. The first was the persistent 
marginalization of local people when compared with the center of the country around Khartoum. 
Declining revenue, services and life changes inevitably forced local people to look more critically 
at their state and to question why so little of the national resources ever came their way.  
Marginalization was made even worse by a second development on the ground: the Failiq al 
Islamiyya (Arab gathering) in 1987. This group – in conjunction with the Libyan and Sudanese 
governments – aimed to create an Arab belt across the top of the Sahel and to displace many of the 
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indigenous African tribes in the area. These plans however, led to a set of unintended 
consequences. The most important of these was an incursion sponsored by the rebel army of the 
South of Sudan (SPLA) into Southern Darfur. It did not succeed, but it raised the concern that the 
peripheral areas of Sudan might unite against the Islamist center. Fearing this situation the 
Sudanese government launched a new offensive on the ground leading to an exponential increase 
in violence and a campaign of harassment, intimidation and land disenfranchisement. Faced with 
escalating violence and the realization that if they did nothing they would be faced with certain 
death, this third issue – violence – acted as a wellspring that drove the conflict forward.  
 These three factors – marginalization, the Arab gathering and escalating violence – brought 
about cracks in the dominant Sudanese discourse, and led to a very interesting development: the 
creation of new insurgent subjectivities and places of political action. To explain this new 
development, we will again turn to Foucault, but this time to his later work. For, while the work of 
the “early” Foucault has served us well to explain the earlier development of cultural and political 
hegemony in Sudan after its independence, the work of the “later” Foucault is better suited to 
explore the later development of new sensibilities and insurgent subjectivities in Sudan.  
 
I.2 Foucault, Aesthetics, and Insurgent Subjectivities  
In Foucault’s later work, we can observe a certain change in perspective: instead of focusing 
solely on the subject as passively constituted, Foucault became interested in the way the subject 
could constitute itself in a more active way.viii This shift in Foucault’s work does not indicate that 
Foucault takes a distance to his former work, but rather shows another view on the problematic of 
the subject – one that approaches the subject from the level of active self-formation. In order to 
understand his approach to the subject in his later work, we have to recognize that, for Foucault, 
power and freedom are not mutually exclusive. He states: “Power is exercised only over free 
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subjects, and only insofar as they are free. […] Consequently there is no face to face 
confrontation of power and freedom which is mutually exclusive […], but a much more 
complicated interplay.”ix Freedom and power appear to be mutually dependent: for power to be 
exercised, freedom is prerequisite. Hence, what emerges is not a subject as a mere passive subject 
of norms, but an active subject that forms itself through and despite these norms. 
 For our comprehension of the new developments in Sudan that included a rejection of the 
dominant political and cultural discourse and an embrace of insurgent-subjectivities, the 
philosophical observations of the later Foucault are of pivotal importance. The fact that 
something like an insurgent subjectivity could emerge is precisely due to the Foucaultian 
recognition that even the most authoritarian and dominating discourse presupposes freedom on 
the part of its subjects to exert its power. In the case of Darfur, this moment of recognition seems 
to have taken place precisely when the political and cultural discourse came to be experienced as 
completely closed, authoritarian and alien. In other words, precisely when the noose began to 
tighten around Darfur, people started to realize their own potential for creating a different kind of 
future. Related to this, in the face of a serial lack of inclusion, the space of national political 
dialogue ceased to become the object of people’s desire for transformation. Instead it became a 
space of political caricature – a space of acting as-if in the face of an authoritarian state.x Instead, 
people turned their attention elsewhere, and created private practices and private spaces –also 
called microspacesxi – where real political dialogue became a possibility.   
 This creation of private practices and spaces echoes yet another important strand of thought of 
the later Foucault. In Foucault’s elaboration of the active constitution of the subject, the question 
of the form of living –and specifically the creative form of living – became unmistakably the 
center of his thoughts. Foucault searched for a form of living that was diametrically opposed to 
the most widespread form of living, the assimilation to ruling norms and social conventions. In 
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contrast to the latter, the art of living – or in other terms: the aesthetics of existence – functions as 
a reflection upon and critique of those norms and conventions, in order to unseal an abundance of 
other possibilities and ways of being. Foucault sought to integrate the creativity that is associated 
with the field of art and aesthetics in life itself. As Bernauer writes: “Foucault’s aesthetics of 
existence wishes to place at the center of both thought and action the imaginative creativity which 
has been exiled to the exclusive practice of art.”xii 
Besides pointing to artful creativity and seeking to include “aesthetic values,”xiii Foucault’s use 
of the term ‘aesthetics’ might also point to something else. Tracing aesthetics back to its Greek 
root aisthesis, Foucault’s use of this term could refer to the sensibility with which we perceive, 
and his quest for an aesthetics of existence could also be a quest for a sharpened sensibility, an 
increased perception of that what happens to us ordinarily. If we take aesthetics in this sense, it 
can then figure as a new form of thinking and acting, as it represents a continuous sensibility over 
and against the prevailing evidences of perception. In its sensibility, it is capable to reject the 
conventional norms of perception. 
 When we apply Foucault’s thoughts about the aesthetics of existence to Darfur, the first thing 
that we can establish is that the creation of insurgent subjectivity seems to be a direct response 
and counterweight to the prevailing discourse of the nation-state as appropriated by the elite. In 
addition, the insurgent groups that came about manifested the aesthesis deemed so important by 
Foucault: they perceived with heightened sensibility that the ossified evidences of perception 
presented by the nation-state model were corrupt and falling apart. Like true artists, the insurgent 
subjectivities that arose created a new architecture for politics, creating new ways of being 
political that differ from the way that traditional politics has been carried out. Politics moved 
from the open into the private domain threading its way in a capillary manner through the social 
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fabric of the countryside, growing strongly in the informal sphere and only occasionally bursting 
into the conventional political scene in the form of violent protest.  
 The new forms of powerful subjectivities came about far from the so-called center of power: 
they arose in the natural remoteness of the Jabal Marra mountains where armed movements could 
organize in their camp. In addition, these forms of insurgence arose in the schools, meeting places 
and mosques of the region. While the prevailing discourse had first provided them with 
exclusion, now the barrier provided by their own tribal languages not understood by elites 
allowed locals to plan, discuss and create alternative political strategies to bring about change. 
Notably, these small networked spaces of political possibility were not only created in real time 
but also created in the virtual sphere.  Through the use of satellite phone technology, it was 
possible to literally jump the barriers of the nation-state – crushing distance and time if necessary 
– to permit engagement to occur between people separated by the crisis. It was, then, these 
spheres that operated outside the confines of the national and allowed voice, where voice 
previously could not be heard. Moreover, these voices were the voices of newly created 
subjectivities – subjectivities that shaped their own, new political worlds. Interestingly, many of 
the voices that came to be heard were also artistic voices in the traditional sense and the next 
section of this paper will turn to discuss a few examples of the artistic voices from Darfur.  
 
I.3 Foucault, Sensibility, and Art from Darfur 
The aesthetics of existence for which Foucault pleads in his later work points to a quest for a 
sharpened sensibility, an increased perception of that what happens to us ordinarily. If we take 
aesthetics in this sense, it figures as a new form of thinking and acting, as it represents a 
continuous sensibility over and against the prevailing evidences of perception. This implies that 
perception and sensibility are not static but flexible and fluid. Foucault speaks about this fluidity 
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when addressing the effects that his own works have had: “There are times in life when the 
question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one 
sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all…[W]hat is philosophy 
today … if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? (emphasis added)”xiv 
Moral and political aesthesis should never be satisfied with the status quo, but should collaborate 
with thinking to search for new ways of seeing and understanding things. In this regard, Foucault 
welcomes the fact that his work has been irritating to so many people. With respect to the 
reaction his own work has received from critics on both the left and right of the political 
spectrum, he states: “the epidermi bristle with a constancy I find encouraging.”xv   
 While some critics have accused that Foucault’s works have left many readers with the idea 
that there is “no possible room for initiative,” Foucault argues that the so-called anaesthetic effect 
associated with his works does not necessarily preclude action. The effect his works have sought 
is precisely, as he states, “that the difficulty of doing anything comes to be felt.”xvi This moment 
is, however, not a sterile or anaesthetic moment – “on the contrary,” as Foucault states. It shows 
increased sensibility insofar as one perceives the difficulties of action, and, thus, a resistance to 
see reality in simple, dualistic terms. No longer can reality be viewed as a set of evidences that 
are either refused or accepted. This leads to a feeling of loss. Only by feeling this loss of 
evidences, and by resisting the pressure of new norms and ideas that force themselves upon us, 
can reality be transformed, according to Foucault. Thus, he seems to treasure a kind of complex 
sensibility that is both sensitive to reality and skeptical and resistant about immediately absorbing 
new evidences of perception and taking action accordingly. 
An example of an artist who seeks to sensitize her audience to the deterioration of life in 
Darfur  is Maryam Ammo, singer from the Fur tribe. Through her lyrics, she gives political 
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expression to the desperation felt by the people of Darfur. Turning to the loss of the young men 
as they desperately try to find solutions outside the region, she sings the following:  
 
When you hear the dying cries 
that are from the  village of merchants, 
Women assured of slaughter, 
Look at how our wealth is destroyed! 
You poor grandmothers; you poor grandfathers, 
Erase those tears of blood from your eyes, 
For there is no protection; 
You are alone. 
The youth have left our homeland 
and they have headed for the Nile. 
 
(Translated from Fur. Sang after the burning of Amaras and Shōba in 2002) 
 
 
Yet another example of an artist who seeks to sensitize his audience to the complexities of the 
violence in Darfur is Boston-based Sudanese artist Khalid Kodi.xvii His work, which intricately 
interweaves the personal and the political,xviii seeks to tell a story of “those who do not have a 
voice.”xix For instance, his installation Dirty Laundry literally exhibits dirty laundry hanging on a 
clothesline outside. Through this installation, Kodi narrates what happens to the regular clothes 
people may wear in a place like Darfur – where innocent citizens are physically attacked and 
made victims of a violent regime. By calling his work Dirty Laundry, Kodi forces us to 
acknowledge that people fail to answer the plight of those innocent victims. Most of the time, 
witnessing and testifying to this violence is a “taboo,” something to be kept silent, to be kept 
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indoors. Thus, the work Dirty Laundry, as Kodi himself says, confronts us with “denial, [with] 
hiding things.”xx By literally exposing the dirty laundry of the Darfurian plight, Kodi seeks to 
irritate, to stimulate our senses, to provoke and challenge us.    
 As Kodi himself writes, art has a special role in challenging people and getting them to think. 
He states: “people sometimes get tired of politicians and direct words. The fine arts asks 
questions, they don’t provide lots of answers, and I feel this is what I do—I challenge the 
mainstream thinking for many Africans and Sudanese. I challenge their absolute through visual 
images—through recreating these visual images and rearranging the creation of the visual images. 
Often that opens venues for dialogue and conversations. I have both good experiences and bad 
experiences, because often I have people who became very mad at me for work I do, and they do 
not like it.”xxi 
  The art that Kodi makes irritates, stimulates, and sensitizes his audience in ways that other 
discourses cannot, and, thus, responds to the appeal for aestheticism for which Foucault pleads. 
The directness of the visual image and its creative force spark us to rethink and adjust our usual 
sensitivities. Simultaneously, his art asks questions, and does not answer them for us. The 
situation he finds his people in forces Kodi, in his own words “to ask the big questions and 
perhaps other people can answer them – if not now, then in the future.”xxii 
 
 
II. Lyotard on the Sublime and the Political 
 
II.1 Genocide and Grand Narratives 
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In the previous section we have seen how Foucault pleads for a sharpened sense of sensibility, 
which entails a call for resistance. In this part of the paper we will tie this idea to the Darfur crisis 
through Lyotard’s notion of aesthetic sensibility. Lyotard discusses in particular the holocaust as 
a failure of universal communicability.xxiii The ideal of such a universality of communication that 
can resolve all conflicts is horribly mistaken since it does not recognize that certain discourses are 
incommensurable. Even more, for certain groups of people, such as the victims of genocide, the 
very possibility to speak is made impossible. Lyotard, in this regard, argues that aesthetic 
sensibility provides the possibility to bear witness to incommensurable discourses that wrong 
certain groups of people. 
Lyotard describes the holocaust within the context of the modern mode of thinking, which he 
characterizes as a mode of grand narratives. The modern western world is not interested in little 
stories, but wants a universal history. Through an absolute trust in reason, the grand narrative of 
the west tells the story of a history that makes continuous progress. Even while history does 
experience set-backs, the ultimate result is always positive and moving towards the better. 
The holocaust, for postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard, constitutes an absolute negativity for 
this history of progress. It is an event that cannot be reconciled. The history of the west is here 
confronted with a horror that disrupts progress and shows that reason does not only lead to 
advancement, but also to destruction. In order to fight the modern trust in reason, postmodernism 
declares war on the grand narratives.  
If the holocaust disrupts and destructs the possibility of modern thinking, how do 
contemporary holocausts, such as Darfur, relate to the narrative of the West? Whereas the 
holocaust occurred in the epicenter of western civilization, the holocausts of our time happen in 
(or outside) the margins of our (Western) world. Darfur is a region where most people live in 
villages as peasants with a lifestyle that has been left behind during the industrial revolution and 
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is not a part of the grand narrative of the west. As such, the victims of these contemporary 
holocausts have been silenced. 
While the global community has promised to never let another holocaust take place, recent 
history has shown otherwise. Moreover, governments who have started a global war on terror and 
overthrew another government, did so on the basis of questionable evidence, whereas these same 
powers are very hesitant to do anything about Darfur, and are questioning every piece of evidence 
as well as our abilities to do anything about it.xxiv 
This “hesitation” about Darfur is not limited to governments. Mahmood Mamdani, for 
example, argues that Darfur is not a holocaust with perpetrators and innocent victims.xxv Instead, 
he claims that Darfur is a civil war initiated by rebels. Yet, as has been argued elsewhere, 
Mamdani fails to recognize that the rebels organized against the genocidal intent of the Sudanese 
government.xxvi As we have seen in the first part of this paper on the Darfur crisis, their rebellion 
was a reaction to their victimization. As they faced a situation of hopelessness and violence they 
were forced to react with violence. Ironically, the fight for their own lives and those of their 
families has had the opposite effect in which self-defense has turned into self-destruction. This 
unintended self-destruction lies in the interpretation of the nature of the crisis: if Darfur is a civil 
war and not a holocaust, the responsibilities of the international community radically change. To 
support those who would be victims under the name “holocaust” would be mandatory, yet to 
support those who are rebels under the name “civil war,” is needless to say, a whole different 
story.  
 
II.2 Deliberative Politics or the Sublime 
The kind of conflict that arises in this “power of naming” is what Lyotard calls a “differend,” the 
situation in which one party loses its ability to bear witness to the injustice done to them. The 
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differend is not a conflict in the sense of a litigation, but it is “a case of conflict between (at least) 
two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both 
arguments.”xxvii It is “the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes 
for that reason a victim.”xxviii His most famous example of a differend is the situation of the Jews 
under German national socialistic laws. By systematically changing the laws, the Nazi regime 
created a situation in which the Jews lost their ability to defend themselves.  
The situation of those who live in villages in Darfur outside of the Political North is very 
similar to the situation of the Jews under Nazi law. They have also legally lost the means to 
defend themselves. Even more, when they do attempt to protect themselves they are accused of 
starting a civil war. The holocaust has become a symbol for the silencing – in the most extreme 
meaning of the word – of a group of people. Even this symbol is denied to the people in Darfur 
by classifying their situation as a self-inflicted civil war.  This is the situation of the differend, in 
which a group is silenced and loses its right to a humane existence.  
One way in which we can bear witness to the differend is, surprisingly, through the aesthetic 
experience of the sublime. Lyotard has explained this as a contradictory experience of pleasure 
and pain, an analysis based on the Kantian sublime. In Kant’s sublime we find a conflict between 
the faculty of reason (the faculty that can think the ideas of infinity and totality) and the faculty of 
imagination. The conflict between these faculties arises because an idea of reason cannot be 
represented by the imagination. An example of this is the idea of infinity which can be thought 
but cannot be visualized or represented. The experience ends in a contradictory feeling; a conflict 
of the faculties of imagination and reason – a feeling of pleasure and pain: pleasure because of the 
evoked idea, and pain because the representation fails.  
We can relate in this regard again to Kodi, whose artwork does not necessarily give answers, 
but asks questions. Moreover, Kodi wants to speak for those who have lost their voice. His 
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artwork attempts to represent a loss that cannot be presented. In his own words he ties the Darfur 
crisis to Nazi Germany: “By not looking, we abandon the child, the man, the woman and indeed, 
the nation. It’s like the Nazis in the 30s and 40s; people knew what was going on but they didn’t 
speak out. By being quiet, they’re contributing to genocide.”xxix  It is exactly this bearing witness 
that is essential to the sublime, as discussed in the following. 
In the essay Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?  Lyotard relates the sublime to 
postmodern politics, which he juxtaposes with deliberative politics and realistic art. Deliberative 
politics as well as realism answers to the “call to order, a desire for unity, security and 
popularity”.xxx Yet, realistic artwork is based on the familiar and within its aesthetics of 
representation nothing outside of the familiar can really touch us. In fact, nothing outside the 
familiar can be presented. On the other hand, art that breaks with the familiar – such as the avant-
garde – may make us experience the sublime and contribute to the receptivity of the human being. 
The avant-garde investigates and breaks with the existing rules of art, and as such attempts to 
represent that which lies outside the laws of representation. Deliberative politics is compared to 
realistic art, as its ideal of reaching consensus only takes into account the familiar, and silences 
any party that does not fit in its model. Deliberative politics, based upon a realistic model of 
representation, is incapable of bearing witness to the silencing of a group. 
While deliberative politics is a politics that forgets or silences as is happening in the Darfur 
crisis, Lyotard argues that we need art that provides a sign of this forgotten. As Kodi wants to 
force us to not look away, Lyotard calls for experiencing a conflict in the sublime, in which we 
feel the absoluteness of the evoked idea, because of the impossibility to represent it. The 
experience of the sublime is evoked by a sensible impression in which the framework of thinking 
disappears and language fails. Within deliberative politics such an event could not have meaning, 
as it cannot be taken up in its narrative. In Darfur we see exactly such a failure. Darfur does not 
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simply represent a problem in which deliberative politics failed to work. Instead, it represents the 
failure of deliberative politics itself in which we can all look the other way. What is needed, 
according to both Kodi and Lyotard, is art that does not merely restate what we already know, but 
instead confronts us with pain and horror. Within deliberative politics the sublime could not have 
a meaning as it represents something outside of universal communicability. Yet for Lyotard, the 
non-phrased, timeless, and thus non-understood experience does have a meaning for us. What is 
experienced is that-which-cannot-be-represented.xxxi  
  Lyotard’s criticism of deliberative politics pertains to the idea of consensus: the idea that we 
can decide after long deliberation, what is just. The idea to create a model for a just society may 
be noble, but according to Lyotard, justice cannot be established through deliberation only, and 
the need for consensus can lead to terror as some party will be silenced. Whereas Habermas and 
others base their theory on the idea that everything can be represented and said, Lyotard argues 
that such an idea leads to terror. This terror is experienced in the radical singularity of the 
sublime. We find here a presentation that does not present: we are confronted with something that 
cannot be put into words. As such it is a contradictory and dubious presentation.  
 
II.3 The Heterogeneity of the Sublime 
In order to tie the terror of the sublime to ethics, Lyotard analyzes Kant’s discussion of the 
French Revolution in the Conflict of the Faculties. Interestingly, this same text is discussed by 
Foucault a year after Lyotard’s discussion. Both Lyotard and Foucault discuss Kant’s description 
of the German people who observed the French revolution from a distance with a sympathy 
“bordering on enthusiasm.”xxxii While we will mostly follow Lyotard’s reading it is important to 
note here that both thinkers tie the sensibility of the individual and politics together through 
Kant’s text, i.e. through a sign of a “universal yet disinterested sympathy” – a signxxxiii, an event, 
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or occurrence (Begebenheit), which proves the “moral tendency of the human race.”xxxiv Such a 
sign is not to be found on the stage of history, but rather in the spectators of the heroic deeds, 
such as the German people who witness the French revolution from a distance, and who reinforce 
by their enthusiasm a sign of this moral tendency. Kant is not discussing the French Revolution 
itself, but the spectators who observe the revolution from a distance, and who therefore do not 
actually see the violence but think about the ends of the revolution. The sympathy of these 
spectators, their passion or enthusiasm, was without any “selfish interests” and even more, “the 
very utterance of this sympathy was fraught with danger.”xxxv  The spectators were however, 
“without the slightest intention of actively participating in their affairs.”xxxvi Because of the lack 
of selfish interests and the involved danger of the enthusiasm, this experience “cannot therefore 
have been caused by anything other than a moral disposition within the human race.”xxxvii 
Foucault’s analysis of this point is very similar: “What is important in the Revolution is not the 
Revolution itself, but what takes place in the heads of those who do not make it or, in any case, 
who are not its principal actors.”xxxviii Whereas Foucault emphasizes that the sign of history is a 
sign of the continuity of progress, Lyotard focuses on the moral duty that is evoked in the 
experience of the revolution. Yet both thinkers connect morality and progress to sensibility. We 
have seen in the first part that Foucault ties this particularly to aesthetic sensibility. Lyotard here 
makes a similar move by explaining the experience of enthusiasm in terms of the sublime. In his 
analysis of Kant he explains the experience of enthusiasm as directed towards the ideal, 
“particularly toward that which is purely moral,”xxxix the noumenal idea, which is evoked by the 
perception of the revolution. The idea is recognized as moral, pure, and that “to which the human 
soul also manifestly acknowledges a duty.”xl This experience of duty, by thinking the idea, shows 
for Kant that we can progress towards the better and that we can cultivate (bilden) ourselves or 
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develop our culture since the idea lies beyond the current political situation and is that towards 
which we strive. 
Lyotard argues that this description of enthusiasm as a sign of our moral disposition can be 
understood in terms of the sublime. In this enthusiasm something is perceived in reality – in this 
case the social historical reality – which awakens a noumenal idea – in this case the ideas of 
freedom, equality and brotherhood.xli Paraphrasing Kant, Lyotard writes: “[t]hat extremely 
painful joy that is enthusiasm is an Affect […] a dementia, a Wahnsinn, where the imagination is 
‘without bridle.’”xlii The “sign of history” – which shows the moral disposition of the human race 
– is not a sign of the sensible world, but, instead, a sign of the “tension of forces produced by 
Ideas.”xliii 
Lyotard emphasizes in this respect the heterogeneity between reality and the noumenon, 
between that which can be perceived on the one hand, and the supersensible idea on the other 
hand. The latter cannot be exemplified in the perceivable reality. Forgetting this distinction 
between these two is the occurrence of a “transcendental illusion in the political realm,”xliv which 
is a confusion of “what is presentable as an object for a cognitive phrase with what is presentable 
as an object for a speculative and/or ethical phrase.”xlv In other words, this is a distinction 
between a descriptive sentence and a prescriptive sentence – the ethical sentence, which is 
absolute as a pure duty. The prescriptive sentence cannot be valid or false, but is from a totally 
different order. For Kant, in Lyotard’s interpretation, the possibility to evoke this prescriptive 
sentence in the sublime judgment of enthusiasm is a sign of progress, or even proof of the 
morality of humanity.  
200 years after the French Revolution, Lyotard does not find enthusiasm in our postmodern 
society. Instead he provides many examples of differends in modern history: Berlin 1953, 
Budapest 1956, Czecho-slovakia 1968, May 1968, and Poland 1980.xlvi These failed revolutions 
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are all concerned with the promises made by the political parties: they promised a passage from 
one genre of discourse to the other, from the social historical reality to the ideal realm. The 
parties promised freedom and unconditioned wealth to the citizens. When the passages to these 
ideals do not become realized, the promised passages “end in bloody impasses.”xlvii  
Here Lyotard is perhaps more negative than Foucault. We have seen argued that Foucault 
finds the possibility of overcoming oppression in the aesthetic sensibility of the individual. Yet, 
Lyotard first of all focuses on the lack of sensibility. According to him, it is the distinction 
between reality and idea which is missing in the political doctrines of the 20th century, and which 
has caused all these horrors. Politics is based too much on the ideals of realism in which we will 
never encounter anything that does not quite fit into our discourse. The politics of our time cannot 
recognize the prescription that is silenced. In endless deliberations we can only listen to those 
who already have a voice, and the voiceless remain voiceless. The wage-earner can only 
complain “in terms of his wage-earning” which is the “language of capital”xlviii; in Nazi Germany 
a Jew can only complain as a Jew, that is as someone who is less than human; and a slave can 
only complain in terms of being a slave. 
Similar to the wage earner in capitalism, the Jew in Nazi Germany and the slave under slavery 
the those who fall outside of the political power in Sudan have been silenced. In the period of 
post-colonial history of Sudan since 1956, the goal has been to construct the nation-state in 
relation to a number of groups privileged by Sudan’s colonial masters. This right to rule has 
produced a dominant culture in Sudan centered on the area of the upper Nile (the Political North), 
and more specifically, a very small number of tribal groups. These groups have all but 
monopolized the right to speak the nation and have been remarkably successful in excluding 
those they define as other. These circumstances have allowed power to be monopolized around 
certain ethnic, cultural and linguistic poles, leaving others little access to claim-making around 
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the concept of nationhood or indeed any of the resources that inevitably go with the control of a 
particular territory. We have already seen above that this situation is characterized by exclusion 
and domination. Foucault has been helpful in explaining such a power-relationship as universal 
and all-domineering. Here we also see that this is exactly the situation described by Lyotard as 
the differend, the situation in which one even lacks the means to express the injustice one 
experiences. Those excluded do not have a voice at all. 
While Lyotard did not live long enough to learn about the atrocities in regions such as Darfur, 
he is quite pessimistic about 20th-century politics. He certainly does not find an attunement of 
enthusiasm in the minds of the spectators at the end of the 20th century, but instead an attunement 
of sorrow or a “disillusioned feeling (resentment?).”xlix This negative feeling “can reach the level 
of the sublime and attest to the heterogeneity between Ideas and realities.”l The feeling of sorrow 
or disillusion is similar to Kant’s enthusiasm, which is a sublime experience. In the sublime, as 
discussed above, the heterogeneity between reality and ideas is experienced as a feeling of 
pleasure and pain. As such, it is a bearing witness to “the gap between ideas and observable 
political reality.”li Sorrow shows the moral disposition of the human being in almost the same 
way as Kant’s enthusiasm does. Lyotard emphasizes that a sign of the moral disposition is given 
in the experience of the differend, i.e. the gap between the genres. The very ability to experience 
the differend, to bear witness to it, shows the morality of humanity. In Post-modernity progress 
has turned into regress, a feeling that things are getting worse. 
 
III. Conclusion 
How can this feeling of regression be helpful for thinking about, or rather acting on Darfur? We 
certainly do not suggest that we should all go to the museum and experience the sublime in order 
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to solve such a problem. Yet, what is important here is the way in which Lyotard discusses our 
postmodern sensibility – that sensibility that allows us to experience the non-presentable. 
Sensibility to the non-presentable permits that which is silenced, or those whose voices are not 
heard, to be expressed. Instead of listening to the voices that we actually and predominantly hear, 
i.e. those who determine the agenda and who already have a voice, the sensibility of the sublime 
can speak for the unspeakable, and bear witness to injustice. Perhaps this makes it possible to not 
endlessly debate about the name we should or should not give to the Darfur crisis; rather, we need 
to recognize the urgency of that which is not named and that which is too cruel for representation. 
The sublime provides as such the simple recognition that we must act now. 
What does it mean to act now?  Acting is what the international community has failed to do as 
the Darfur crisis developed. The crisis is not simply a problem that can be solved by restoring 
deliberative democracy. We cannot simply blame a failed system in Sudan, but we have to 
acknowledge the failure of deliberative politics as such. We have shown that while genocide has 
been taking place the international community was fighting about what name to give to the crisis: 
is it a civil war, or is it genocide? The semantic debate about the crisis shows the insensibility of 
this politics, since it fails to sense the violence and the need to take action against that violence.  
In this paper we have argued that aesthetic sensibility has to play a crucial role in an ethical 
politics in order to sense the injustice that occurs in places such as Darfur. Such a sensibility can 
be raised through songs or other forms of art. It can provide hope to those who are wronged, or it 
can call attention to a crisis that no one wants to see. It is easy to look the other way, or to debate 
about the name to be used, but art that confronts one with the terror of the sublime will confront 
us with the reality of the horror and urge us to take action. By confronting us with the reality of 
violence in new and abrasive ways, art seeks to readjust our ethical sensitivities, while 
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simultaneously pointing out that easy answers to tragedies such as the Darfur Crisis inevitably 
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